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Abstract— Collaboration between stakeholders in the 
agro-food sector is nowadays a common phenomenon. 
Despite the huge diversity observed, this paper argues 
that collective action always results in the establishment 
of a collective organization (whether formally organized 
or not), which is characterized by the presence of a 
coordination centre. This organism represents all 
partners united in the collective and performs tasks by 
order of the individual members and the group. From a 
theoretical point of view, all collective organizations 
qualify as hybrid organizations, which can be studied 
through the lens of Transaction Costs Economics. 
Hybrids governance structures are a large set of 
arrangements that are situated between markets and 
hierarchies. When organizing transactions, hybrids do 
not purely rely on the price mechanism or authority, but 
rather on an interplay of four coordination mechanisms. 
These coordination mechanisms are the central element 
of this paper and we hypothesize that their degree of 
formalization is positively correlated with the 
complexity of the tasks faced by the coordination centre.  
To test this hypothesis, a survey was designed and 
information was gathered on some general and 
organizational characteristics of 65 collective initiatives 
in the Flemish agro-food sector.  Information on the 
coordination mechanism could thereby be directly 
gathered, but the complexity of the tasks was 
approximated by the collective organization’s objectives, 
the characteristics of the specifications in force and the 
entry rules for members. The analysis proves that there 
is indeed a positive relationship between the degree of 
formalization of the coordination mechanisms on the 
hand and the complexity of coordination centre’s tasks. 
Information devices occurs in combination with 
informal cooperation in small groups, contracts are 
adopted by groups of 5 to 14 members to realize medium 
complex objectives and formal coordination (extern 
regulation and new governance bodies) is finally linked 
to quality differentiation, which requires considerable 
efforts in the definition and enforcement of product 
and/or process specifications. 
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Together with the evolution from the agro-industrial 
model to the sustainable rural development model [1], 
agro-food markets have evolved from anonymous, 
mass food markets to quality-food markets. These are, 
amongst others, characterised by a clear trend towards 
coordination between actors in food supply chains, 
new forms of dynamism and innovative forms of 
cooperation, such as alternative food supply chains 
[2]. Socially embedded relations are a central element 
within these new supply chain configurations and 
great efforts are generally punt in establishing and 
maintaining transparent, ‘shortened’ chains of 
connection between food producers and food 
consumers [3]. The emergence of these new 
governance structures is driven by several factors, 
such as the changing relations between supply chain 
actors due to the concentration processes in the retail 
and processing sectors, the growing importance of 
quality standards, considerable changes in consumer 
habits and preferences, the increasing attention for the 
multifunctional dimensions of agriculture and the 
establishment of new markets for public goods and 
services [4, 5]. 
Collective action in food supply chains is often 
adopted for reasons that relate to supply chain 
logistics, but it can also be used as a strategic 
instrument, for realizing market differentiation, for 
increasing market share, or for obtaining niche 
protection [6-8]. Besides the aim of collective action, 
we focus our analysis on the capacity of collective 
organization to coordinate the actions of the individual 
members. Collective organizations are hereby defined 
as the outcome of (in)formal cooperation between two 
or more companies in order to realize a common 
objective or effect. The partners can consist of 
different types of food supply chain actors (such as 
farmers, processors, retailers or consumers), but also 
non-chain actors like the government or environmental 
organizations. Each collective organization is 
furthermore characterized by the presence of a 
coordination centre and their activities, organization 
and coordination mechanisms applied are at the core 
of this paper.  
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Our analysis builds upon the general framework of 
New Institutional Economics and especially 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and the economics 
of hybrid organizations, which both have transactions 
or the transfer of rights between actors as the unit of 
analysis. Arranging transactions among partners is 
namely a decisive for taking advantage of the division 
of labour, but this also requires coordinating complex 
devices to organise the transfers (micro level) and 
institutions to facilitate and enforce the transfers 
(macro level) [9]. Our attention is on the micro level 
analysis of transactions and the paper investigates 
which objectives are realized through collective 
action, how the member’s transfers of rights are 
formalized and the coordination mechanisms applied. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we 
elaborate upon some general characteristics of TCE 
and the economics of hybrid organizations and review 
the literature on coordination centres, focusing on the 
different tasks they perform and the coordination 
mechanisms applied. This provides us with the 
necessary theoretical background to test the hypothesis 
that a more formal organization and a higher degree of 
coordination are needed when the coordination centre 
has to perform more complex tasks. Section three will 
therefore discuss the characteristics of a sample of 
collective organizations in the Flemish agro-food 
sector. The section starts with a descriptive analysis of 
the relevant variable and an exploration of the 
relationship between the different variables. Then all 
variables are entered into a multiple correspondence 
analysis to explore the correlation between the 
coordination mechanism and the descriptive variables. 
The paper concludes with the discussion of the 
findings and the research hypothesis in the final 
section. 
 
II. COORDINATION CENTRES IN FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS 
 
A.  Introduction to hybrid governance structures 
It was already mentioned in the introduction that we 
frame our analysis within the TCE framework. The 
field of TCE has evolved significantly since the early 
works of the founding fathers Coase and Williamson 
[10, 11], but the basic principles have remained 
unaltered: the organization of transactions involves 
transaction costs and these costs can be minimized by 
implementing the most appropriate governance 
structure. The theory furthermore postulates that 
governance structures have an important impact on the 
economic performance of commercial actors, and that 
these governance structures can be analyzed through 
rigorous theoretical and empirical methods [12]. Based 
upon Williamson’s initial analysis [13], the literature 
identifies three factors that influence the size of 
transaction costs: (i) asset specificity or the degree in 
which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses 
without the loss of productive value, (ii) the frequency 
of transactions (as recurrent transactions make it easier 
to recover the costs of specific investments) and 
finally, (iii) the environmental and behavioural 
uncertainty that surround the transaction. It is then the 
interplay of these three factors that will determine 
which governance arrangement is the most appropriate 
[13-15].  
These external factors will however not be studied 
in depth in this paper, as our analysis focuses on the 
internal aspects of collective organizations, but the 
analysis of these factors gave rise to identification of 
three main groups of governance structures (as shown 
in , with hybrids representing a whole range of 
organisational forms between markets and hierarchies. 
These governance structures can best be described as 
specialized governance structures for dealing with 
bilateral dependence without going as far as 









Fig. 1 Asset specificity and transaction costs under different governance 
structures [Source: 13] 
 
Hybrid governance structures are very prominent in 
the agro-food sector [9] with farmers’ cooperatives, 
interprofessional organizations that regulate and 
market PDO products, collective trademarks and 
contract farming as examples. Despite the large 
heterogeneity of hybrids governance structures, 
Ménard [14] identifies three common characteristics:  
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•  The partners in a hybrid governance structure pool 
(part of) their resources and their strategic decision 
rights, but keep at the same time the majority of their 
property rights and their associated decision rights 
distinct 
•  The relationships between partners are regulated by 
contracts, but these contract are in general incomplete 
and not tailored on purpose and 
•  Competition persists between the partners in a 
hybrid and between hybrids and alternative 
organizational forms.  
 
Especially the first two characteristics and their 
outcomes are of interest for this paper. The transfer of 
decision rights and the relationship between partners 
give rise to a coordination centre. The following 
paragraph continues with the discussion of the 
literature on these coordination centres, their role and 
functioning in hybrid governance structures and the 
coordination mechanisms that are adopted. These 
findings are then complemented by the results of a 
study on Flemish collective organizations that are 
involved in the agro-food sector.  
 
B.  Coordination centre and mechanisms 
 
Coordination centres are in this paper defined as the 
entities that represent the collective organization and 
perform tasks by order of the collective and the 
cooperating members. In the agro-food sector, these 
tasks can be very diverse, such as quality coordination 
amongst partners and the elaboration of food safety 
guarantees [8, 16, 17], the reduction of information 
asymmetry between partners [18, 19], the 
development of a collective labelling system [15, 20], 
coordination of supply and demand [9, 21] and 
collective marketing activities [22, 23]. Although this 
enumeration shows that a lot of research has been 
carried out on hybrids in the agro-food sector, the 
information on coordination centres and their 
coordination mechanisms is very limited. This paper 
aims to contribute to the description of these elements 
and therefore investigates how coordination centres 
can assure internal governance without purely relying 
on prices (as in markets) and when it cannot simply 
impose its rules as is the case in hierarchies. Ménard 
[24] identifies four different key mechanisms, which 
each delineate various degrees of authority: 
•  Information devices 
The need for information devices as a coordination 
mechanism has evolved from a background of 
asymmetric information between partners, while the 
partnership is at the same time also severely 
constrained the role of prices. The information devices 
are bi-directional and can function amongst partners, 
but also as an interface with the environment. This 
coordination mechanism can be found in almost any 
example of collective organization to enhance the 
transfer of decision rights by the members. 
•  Contracts 
Contracts always had a significant role in 
cooperation and collective organizations, but, 
according to Ménard [14, 15, 24], their role has been 
overstated due to the problem of incompleteness and 
the need for adaptability in a changing world. Neo-
classical contracts are typical for hybrid organizations 
and these are conceived as self-enforcing mechanisms 
that can be formal and/or informal and facilitators for 
organizing the relationship between partners. 
•  Exogenous regulator or monitor 
Incomplete contracts and/or an exogenous impulse 
to cooperate are motives for the establishment of 
exogenous monitoring. Distinction can hereby be 
made between monitoring with public authorities as 
initiator, private monitoring initiatives and a 
combination of public and private monitoring (e.g. 
private certification body that is recognized by the 
government to perform certain controls). 
•  A governing body of its own 
The final coordination mechanism is the 
establishment of a formal framework within which 
contracts are initiated, negotiated, monitored, enforced 
and terminated. It concerns the building of a formal 
authority, can take different forms and involves a 
significant degree of centralization, formalization and 
control over property rights. 
 
The order of the coordination mechanisms also 
reflects Ménard’s proposition that the higher the 
benefits of coordination and/or the complexity of 
transactions, the higher the costs of governance for 
getting that coordination. There is hence a trade of 
between a growing degree of formalization and 
centralization on the one hand and coordination 
benefits on the other [24]. Until now, quantitative 
research on this matter is virtually inexistent and will 
therefore be investigated in the remainder sections of 
this paper.  
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III. RESEARCH SETTING 
 
To explore the research question, we rely on a 
database that describes 65 collective organizations 
operating in the Flemish agro-food sector. These 
initiatives were selected from an initial inventory of 
402 examples of all types of collaboration that involve 
farmers. The database was composed based on 
existing inventories on collective action and 
complemented with the input of experts who guide 
collective action amongst farmers and between 
farmers and other stakeholders. Because of the 
presence of inactive or incomplete initiatives, but also 
initiatives that are not complementary with our focus 
on the coordination of marketing oriented activities, 
the following criteria were designed for the selection 
of initiatives: (i) complete and active initiatives, (ii) 
collaboration around a marketable product (food or 
non-food), (iii) involvement of several partners, (iv) 
long-term involvement of the partners in the collective 
organization and (v) only one replication of each 
initiative (especially farmers’ markets and individual 
food teams were overrepresented in the initial 
inventory).  
In the next research phase, information on the 
initiatives was gathered through a survey, that covered 
questions on the following topics: (i) start and 
objective of the initiative, (ii) characteristics of the 
partners in the collaboration, (iii) size and evolution of 
the initiative, (iv) internal organization and 
governance, (v) tasks and financing of the 
coordination centre, (vi) product characteristics, (vii) 
characteristics of the main marketing transactions and 
(viii) support (both financial and other types) granted 
to the collective.  
This lead to an extensive database with information 
on collective organizations, but only a small number 
of variables will be addressed in this paper to explore 
how general characteristics and elements on the start 
of an initiative can be related to the coordination 
mechanism in practice. We thereby test the hypothesis 
that there is a positive relationship between the 
formalization of the coordination mechanism and the 
complexity of tasks the coordination centre has to 
realize.  
In the next section, we will discuss the results of a 
descriptive analysis of the data, non-parametrical 
comparisons between the (categories of the) different 
variables and a multiple correspondence analysis that 





A.  Characteristics of the collective organizations  
 
The first part of our analysis concerns the 
description of the initiatives concerning some general 
elements (type of product, number of actors involved 
and direction of the collective action within the chain), 
a description of the initiative’s characteristics at the 
start (initiator, reasons for setting up the initiative, 
initial objectives and starting period) and some 
elements on the way in which they are organized 
(entrance rules, prescriptions applied and coordination 
mechanisms in place). This descriptive analysis not 
only allows explore the characteristics of our database, 
but also enable us to define and explain the choices 
that have been made. An overview of the 
characteristics is shown in Table 1.  
 
The first group of variables in this descriptive 
analysis concerns some characteristics that should help 
us to get a general view of a collective organization. 
Three questions are thereby addressed: Around what 
type of product is the collective action organized? 
How many actors are involved? How do these actors 
relate to each other? Are they situated on one 
particular chain level or does the initiative concerns 
collaboration between actors combined at different 
levels in the chains, e.g. collaboration between a 
farmers and a processor? 
A first observation concerning the data is that 
several general characteristics have one predominant 
category. This dominance could be caused by the 
nature of our inventory and selection criteria, but we 
believe that it much more plausible to acknowledge 
that this prevalence is a true reflection of the reality of 
collective action in Flanders. It can then be 
summarized that the collective organizations in the 
Flemish agro-food sector are mainly concerned with 
food products (76,9% of the 65 initiatives) and involve 
members that are situated at the same chain level, for 
example a group of farmers (61,5%). The number of 
members per initiatives is more evenly spread over the 
categories, with ca. 30% of the groups that have less 
than 5 or between 15 and 50 members. The other two 
groups (between 5 and 14 and more than 50 members) 
each represent one fifth of the collective organizations 
in our database. 
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Table 1. Descriptive characteristics of the 65 collective organizations in 
the sample 
 
Characteristic  Categories  Number of 
initiatives 
General characteristics 
• Food products  50 
• Non-food products  9 
Type of 
product 
• Both food and non-food products  6 
• Less than 5  19 
• Between 5 and 14  13 
• Between 15 and 50  20 
Number of 
members 
• More than 50  13 
• Several actors at one chain level  40 
• Collaboration between chain levels  7 
Actors 
involved 
• Combination of previous types  18 
Start of the initiative 
• Before 1990  6 
• Between 1990 and 1999  19 
Starting 
period 
• 2000 and later  40 
• Collective  51 
• Leading partner  7  Initiator 
• Third party  7 
• Perceived opportunity  22 
• Problem and/or crisis in the sector  8 
• Project funding available  4 
• Advantages of short supply chains  45 
• Improving sales  6 
• Replication of successful initiatives  3 
Reason for 
the start of 
the initiative 
• Improving the offer  10 
• Composing a collective offer  5 
• Collaboration for sale  8 
• Collective (processing and) sales  21 
• Facilitation of members’ activities  8 
Aim of the 
initiative 
• Quality differentiation  23 
Organizational characteristics 
• No formal organization  12 
• Open group  24 
Type of 
collective 
organization  • Club  29 
• No specifications  26 
• Organic prescriptions  14 
• EU protected designation  6 
Product(ion) 
specifications 
• Own specifications  19 
• Information devices  14 
• Contracts  33 
• Exogenous monitoring  5 
Coordination 
mechanism 
• A governing body of its own  13 
 
The second section of the table then focuses on 
variables that describe the initiatives’ start, with data 
on the starting period, a classification of the initiator, 
the reasons why the collective action was started and 
the initial objectives the partners wanted to realize. 
The data learn that the majority of the initiatives 
(61,5% ) were founded in the year 2000 or later, 
29,2% of the initiatives were started in the nineties and 
9,2% even started earlier (seventies and eighties). An 
important number of collective organizations (78,5%) 
were initiated by a group of people. The analysis of 
the motivations to start learns that one third of the 
initiatives (33,8%) started because of the starter’s 
perceived opportunities to differentiate their product 
or to realize a certain market share with a new product. 
Other motivations to initiate collaboration were to 
capture the advantages of short supply chains (18,5%), 
to be able to compose a more balanced offer (15,4%), 
to overcome problems and/or crises in the sector 
(12,3%) and several less important reasons (20,0%). 
The final variable discusses the initiatives’ objectives 
and these are to a large extent in line with the 
occasions to start the collaboration. The two most 
important objectives are the implementation of quality 
assurance and quality differentiation schemes (35,4%) 
and the establishment of a supply chain for collective 
sales (whether with collective processing or not) 
(32,3%). Other objectives are the facilitation and 
guidance of the members’ activities (12,3%), 
collaboration for sale (without joining the products of 
the members together) (12,3%) and the composition of 
a collective offer by exchanging the members’ 
products (7,7%). 
 
In section II, we argued that despite the apparent 
differences, all collective organizations have a centre 
of coordination. The third groups of variables now try 
to capture on the one hand the tasks that are attributed 
to such coordination centres, namely the establishment 
of rules for the entrance of new members and the 
codes of practices in force and the coordination 
mechanisms on the other. A first organizational 
characteristic that may determine the complexity of 
the tasks to be tackled by the coordination centre and 
the coordination mechanisms needed are the 
prescriptions or codes of practices in place. We hereby 
refer to product and production techniques imposed by 
the collective to all partners, but these do not concern 
the rules that describe elements like the functioning of 
the group and the members' rights and duties. We 
thereby distinguish two groups of initiatives that do 
not design product(ion) specifications themselves. 
Forty percent of the initiatives do not have any 
prescription, while 21,5% requires organic 
certification without adding other prescriptions. In the 
other two cases, the coordination centres have 
developed own prescriptions and distinction can be 
made between initiatives who fit their code of 
practices in with the European legislation on the 
promotion and protection of food products (9,2%) and 
those who develop their own, independent 
requirements (29,2%).  
Another task of the coordination centre (which is 
expected to influence the coordination mechanism in 
place) is the development of entrance rules that 
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determine which partners are in the group and which 
are out. Accession is not an issue in groups that have 
no formal rules and organization (18,5%), but the 
initiatives that have implemented formal rules and 
codes of practices are categorized classified into two 
categories. Open groups, on the hand, are 
characterised by the fact that everyone who is in 
accordance with the code of practices can enter the 
group (36,9%), while clubs, on the other, select the 
new members themselves (44,6%).  
Coordination mechanisms, as described in section 
II, are the final organizational characteristic in our 
descriptive analysis. The results learn that contracts 
(both formal and informal) are the most prominent 
mechanism (50,8%) in our sample, followed by new 
governing bodies (20,0%), information devices 
(21,5%) and exogenous monitoring (7,7%). 
 
B.  Exploration of coordination mechanisms in 
collective organizations 
 
After the general discussion of the sample 
characteristics in the previous paragraph, we continue 
our analysis and explore the relationship between the 
variables to test relationship between coordination 
mechanisms and the coordination centre’s tasks. We 
thereby use the three organizational characteristics and 
the objective as core variables.  
The first step in our analysis is a correlation 
analysis between these four variables. The results, 
summarized in Table 2, learn that there is a significant 
positive correlation between the coordination 
mechanism in place and both the type of specifications 
applied and the aim of the initiative, but these last two 
variables are also correlated between themselves. 
 
Table 2. Pearson correlation of the organizational characteristics and the 
objectives of the initiatives 
 
Variables  1  2  3  4 
1. Coordination mechanism  1,000 ,032 ,595
**
    ,623
**
2. Type of collective org.  ,032 1,000 -,028 -,135 
3. Product(ion) specifications  ,595
**
   
   
-,028 1,000 ,668
**
4. Aim of the initiative  ,623
** -,135 ,668
** 1,000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test allows us to compare the 
distribution of initiatives over the different categories 
of the variables for the four coordination mechanisms. 
To gain more insight in the nature of the correlations 
between the variables, the distribution over the 
categories is explored through cross-tabulation and 
non-parametric testing (Mann Whitney and Kruskal-
Wallis H tests). The results of these analyses are 
shown in Table 3. An important note hereby is that the 
variables’ categories are ordered so that they reflect 
(according to our judgment) an increasing complexity. 
For the objectives of collaboration, for example, this 
implies that we consider the composition of a 
collective offer the least and quality differentiation the 
most complex objectives.  
The results show that the objectives and 
specifications indeed differ according to the 
coordination mechanism in place. Further one-on-one 
comparisons of the coordination mechanisms (through 
Mann Whitney tests) learn that, for both variables, 
there are no significant differences between 
information devices and contracts and between 
exogenous monitoring and new governing bodies. The 
aims and prescriptions of initiatives with contracts are 
however significantly less complex in comparison 
with exogenous monitoring (p-value is 0,034 and 
0,001 for the aims and specifications respectively) and 
new governing bodies (each have a p-value of 0,000). 
Information devices have furthermore less complex 
objectives in comparison with new governing bodies 
(p = 0,000) and their specifications are less complex in 
comparison with exogenous monitoring (p=0,000) and 
new governing bodies (p=0,000). 
 
C.  Coordination mechanisms in relation to other 
characteristics 
 
A final part of our analysis concerns a multiple 
correspondence analysis. This technique is used to get 
a visual impression of the link between the four types 
of coordination mechanisms and the variables that 
describe the actual state of the collective 
organizations. The results of the analysis is a two 
dimensional figure that visualises the relation between 
the categories of the variables included and the cases. 
Multiple correspondence analysis is a technique for 
data-reduction that plots cases of the same category 
near to each other. In a two-dimensional figure, two 
sets of values are calculated to reach a maximal 
spreading of the categories [25, 26].  
As mentioned higher, our multiple correspondence 
analysis concerns the actual state of the collectives. 
Next to the organizational characteristics and 
objectives, the included variables are the number of 
members, the type of product and the direction of the 
collaboration (at one chain level, between levels or a 
combination of both). This analysis results in a model 
with two dimensions that has a Cronbach’s Alpha 
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value of 0,756. The graphic outputs of the model are  shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 2.  
Table 3. Objectives, collective organization and specifications in function of the coordination mechanism 
 
Coordination mechanism 
Variable and categories  Information 
devices 
(n = 14) 
Contracts 
(n = 33) 
Exogenous 
monitoring 
(n = 5) 
New entity 
(n = 13) 
Aim of the initiative (%)* 
• Collective offer  35,7 0,0  0,0  0,0 
• Collaboration for sale  7,1 18,2  20,0 0,0 
• Collective sales  28,6 51,5  0,0  0,0 
• Facilitation  7,1 21,2 0,0  0,0 
• Quality differentiation  21,4 9,1 80,0  100,0 
Type of collective organization (%) 
• No formal organization  50,0 12,1  0,0  7,7 
• Open group  7,1 30,3  80,0  69,2 
• Club  42,9 57,6 20,0 23,1 
Product(ion) specifications (%)* 
• No specifications  71,4 48,5  0,0  0,0 
• Organic specifications  14,3 33,3  0,0  7,7 
• EU protected designation  0,0 3,0 0,0  38,5 
• Own prescriptions  14,3 15,2  100,0  53,8 








The plot of discrimination measures identifies the 
variables that determine each of the dimensions in 
our model. The first dimension has an eigenvalue of 
3,294 and accounts for 47,0% of the variance. This 
dimension is mainly determined by the 
specifications in place, as this variable has relatively 
higher values for dimension 1 in comparison with 
dimension 2. The second dimension has an 
eigenvalue of 2,385, explains 34,1% of the variance 
and is mainly determined by the direction of the 
collaboration and the type of product. The other 
variables in the analysis have comparable values for 
both dimension and have thus an impact on both 
dimensions.  
The joint plot of category points (shown in Fig. 3) 
reveals which characteristics are in our dataset most 
often combined with each of the coordination 
mechanisms. The results learn that three ‘clouds’ of 
characteristics can be identified around the 
coordination mechanisms, which are generally in 
line with our hypothesis and Ménard’s proposition, 
as mentioned earlier in this paper.  
Information devices, the most informal and least 
formalized coordination mechanism, is by the 
collective organizations in our dataset often 
combined with other characteristics of informal 
collaboration between partners. It concerns the 
absence of a formal organization (and thereby the 
absence of entry rules), small groups (less than five 
members) and, to a lesser extent, a simple objective 
like the composition of a collective offer. The fact 
that these informal coordination mechanism and 
loose cooperation often concerns the vertical 
cooperation between actors at different levels in the 
chain is a surprise, but should mainly be attributed 
to our dataset. In the early phases of the research, 
traditional examples of vertical cooperation, like 
supply contracts to large processors and retailers, 
were not included in the inventory. Our focus was 
more on innovative, quality-oriented examples of 
vertical supply chain coordination and these appear 
to be organized rather informally.  
Contracts are a more formal coordination 
mechanism and these appear to be linked with 8 
 
simple to medium complex objectives (collaboration 
for sales, facilitation and collective sales). The 
coordination mechanism is adopted to govern 
relatively small groups (5 to 14 members) that have 
chosen to use of the national organic specifications 
to define the quality of their products. They 
furthermore apply club rules to regulate the entrance 
of new members and the combination of horizontal 
and vertical collaboration. The presence of non-food 





Fig. 3 Joint plot of category points resulting from the multiple 
correspondence analysis 
 
The final group of characteristics in the graph 
concerns the two most formal coordination 
mechanisms, namely exogenous monitoring and new 
governance bodies. In correspondence with the 
research hypothesis, the coordination centres of 
these collective organizations with formal 
coordination mechanisms have, according to our 
classification, the most complex task to realize: the 
realization of quality differentiation. They therefore 
to develop and enforce a brand based upon own 
prescriptions or a code of practices which is based 
upon the EU rules on protected designations. These 
initiatives have in generally a medium to large scale 
and function as an open group. 
Next to the characteristics that can be linked with 
the three groups of coordination mechanisms, there 
is also a cloud of dots between the three circles. 
These characteristics occur in our dataset in 
combination with all coordination mechanisms and 
can therefore not be a located to one specific 




Collective action is nowadays a common 
phenomenon in food supply chains and is adopted to 
improve supply chain logistics, but also as a 
strategic instrument to realize diverse objectives. 
This collective action and the resulting organizations 
are very diverse, but this paper aimed to analyze 
collective organization’s capacity to coordinate the 
actions of the individual members and therefore 
adopted a Transaction Cost Economics approach. 
Collective organizations were thereby defined as the 
outcome of (in)formal cooperation between two or 
more companies (which can be any food supply 
chain actor or non-chain actor) in order to realize a 
common objective or effect. Each of these 
organizations is furthermore characterized by the 
presence of a coordination centre, which represents 
the collective organization and performs tasks by 
order of the collective and the cooperating members. 
To test the hypothesis that there is a positive 
correlation between the coordination mechanism 
applied and the complexity of the objectives and the 
tasks that have to be performed, a survey was 
performed with 65 examples of collective action in 
the Flemish agro-food sector was performed. The 
data were then explored through a descriptive 
analysis, non-parametrical data testing and finally, 
the execution of a multiple correspondence analysis. 
We thereby focused upon two main tasks, (i) the 
elaboration and enforcement of product(ion) 
specifications and (ii) the rules for the accession of 
new members. The results of our analyses confirm 
our hypothesis, as there are indeed significant 
differences between the coordination mechanisms. 
We namely found that relatively simple objectives 
(such as the composition of an offer and facilitation 
activities) and the absence of specifications are more 
common in the less formal coordination 
mechanisms, while the design of own prescriptions 
and quality differentiation as an objective are linked 
to the more formal coordination mechanisms. 
Concerning the entrance rules, no differences could 
be found between the different coordination 
mechanisms. 
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The economics of hybrid organizations and the 
coordination mechanisms defined by Ménard [24] 
are very suitable starting points for the analysis of 
coordination centre, but the challenge is now to 
strengthen the theoretical framework by quantitative 
research. This paper was hereby a first attempt to 
test (part of) the proposition that costs of governance 
are increase when there are higher benefits of 
coordination and/or more complex transactions, but 
future research and especially more extensive 
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1.  Roep D, Wiskerke JSC (2004) Reflecting on Novelty 
Production and Niche Management in Agriculture. In: Wiskerke JSC, 
van der Ploeg JD, eds. Seeds of Transition: Essays on novelty 
production, niches and regimes in agriculture. Royal Van Gorcum Press, 
The Netherlands. pp. 341-356. 
2.  Marsden T, Banks J, Bristow G (2000) Food supply chain 
approaches: exploring their role in rural development. Sociologia ruralis 
40:424-438. 
3.  Venn L, Kneafsey M, Holloway L, et al. (2006) Researching 
European 'alternative' food networks: some methodological 
considerations. Area 38:248-258. 
4.  Jahn G, Zerger C, Peter S, et al. (2007) Status Quo Analysis 
(WP3). European comparative report. . Frankfurt / Main (Germany): 
IfLS (J.W. Goethe University); 2007 April 2007Contract No.: 
Document Number|. 
5.  Kirwan J, Slee B, Foster C, et al. (2003) Macro-level analysis 
of food supply chain dynamics and diversity. Synthesis Report. 
Cheltenham: University of Gloucestershire, Countryside and 
Community Research Unit; 2003Contract No.: Document Number|. 
6.  Vuylsteke A, Collet E, Van Huylenbroeck G, et al. (2003) 
Exclusion of farmers as a consequence of quality certification and 
standardisation. Cahiers Options Méditerranéennes : Food Quality 
Products in the Advent of the 21st Century: Production, Demand and 
Public Policy 64:291-306. 
7.  Ménard C, Klein PG (2004) Organizational issues in the 
agrifood sector: toward a comparative approach. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 86:746-751. 
8.  Hobbs JE, Fearne A, Springs J (2002) Incentive structures for 
food safety and quality assurance: an international comparison. Food 
Control 13:77-81. 
9.  Ménard C, Valceschini E (2005) New institutions for 
governing the agri-food industry. European Review of Agricultural 
Economics 32:421-440. 
10.  Coase RH (1937) The nature of the firm. Economica 4:386-
405. 
11.  Williamson OE (1975) Markets and hierarchies. Free Press, 
New York. 
12.  Réviron S, Vuylsteke A, Van Huylenbroeck G (forthcoming) 
Hybrid firms and the distribution of decision-making power within 
sustainable food supply chain initiatives. In: Wiskerke JSC, Van 
Huylenbroeck G, Kirwan J, eds. Sustaining food supply chains: 
grounded perspectives on the dynamics and impact of new modes of 
food provision. Ashgate, Aldershot. 
13.  Williamson OE (1991) Comparative economic organization: 
the analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 36:269-296. 
14.  Ménard C (2004) The economics of hybrid organizations. 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160:345-376. 
15.  Ménard C (1996) On clusters, hybrids and other strange 
forms: The case of the French poultry industry. Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics 152:154-183. 
16.  Morris C, Young C (2000) Seed to shelf, teat to table, barley 
tot beer and womb to tomb: discourses of food quality and quality 
assurance schemes in the UK. Journal of Rural Studies 16. 
17.  Holleran E, Bredahl ME, Zaibet L (1999) Private incentives 
for adopting food safety and quality assurance. Food policy 24:669-683. 
18.  Hennessy DA (1996) Information asymmetry as reason foor 
food industry vertical integration. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 1996:1034-1043. 
19.  Bijman J, Hendrikse G (2003) Co-operatives in chains: 
institutional restructuring in the Dutch fruit and vegetable industry. 
Journal on Chain and Network Science 3:95 - 107. 
20.  Raynaud E, Sauvée L, eds. (Year) Common labelling and 
producer organizations: a transaction cost economics approach. EAAE 
seminar: the socio-economics of origin labelled products in agrifood 
supply chains: spatial institutional and co-ordination aspects. 
21.  Réviron S, Chappuis J-M (2005) Effects of the Swiss 
retailers' strategy on the governance structure of the fresh food products 
supply chains. Agribusiness 21:237-252. 
22.  Lence SH, Marette S, Hayes DJ, et al. (2007) Collective 
marketing arrangements for geographically differentiated agricultural 
products: welfare impacts and policy implications. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 89:947-963. 
23.  Verhaegen I, Van Huylenbroeck G (2001) Costs and benefits 
for farmers participating in innovative marketing channels for quality 
food products. Journal of Rural Studies 17:443-456. 
24.  Ménard C (2007) The governance of hybrid organizations.  
EMNet conference on economics and management of networks; 2007 
June 28-30, 2007; Rotterdam (the Netherlands). 
25.  SPSS (1999) SPSS Categories 10.0. SPSS Inc., Chicago. 
26.  Vuylsteke A, Collet E, Van Huylenbroeck G, et al. (2005) 
Exclusion of farmers as a consequence of quality certification and 
standardisation. Cahiers Options Méditerranéennes : Food Quality 
Products in the Advent of the 21st Century: Production, Demand and 
Public Policy 64:291-306. 
 
 
•  Author: Anne Vuylsteke 
•  Institute: Ghent University, Department of Agricultural Economics 
•  Street: Coupure Links 653 
•  City: Gent 
•  Country: Belgium 
•  Email: Anne.Vuylsteke@UGent.be 
 
 